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1. INTRODUCTION
There is now an extensive literature regarding the eﬃcient design of in-
centive mechanisms in dynamic environments. Included in this literature
are models with privatelyobserved endowment shocks (Green [6], Thomas
and Worrall [13], Phelan [9], Wang [15], among others), privatelyobserved
taste shocks (Atkeson and Lucas [2]) and privatelyobserved eﬀort levels
(Spear and Srivastava [11], Phelan and Townsend [10], Phelan [8], Hopen-
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hayn and Nicolini [7], among others). In all of the above examples, there are
no exogenous links between periods involving privatelyobserved variables.
For instance, in the privatelyobserved endowment and taste shock models,
shocks are assumed to be independent over time. In the privatelyobserved
eﬀort environments, current variables are functions onlyof current eﬀort
and current (time independent) shocks. Such separations between periods
were assumed for the sake of tractability, not realism.1
In fact, in most dynamic situations the presence of intertemporal links
is overwhelming. Examples include serial correlation in individual income
realizations, serial correlation in one’s health condition, the fact that the
probabilityof currentlyﬁnding a job depends on past search eﬀort and the
fact that crop output todayis a function of the waythe soil was treated in
previous periods. Given this, relaxing time independence in the context of
dy namic agencytheoryis certainlya pertinent step.
The main simpliﬁcation one gets byassuming no exogenous links be-
tween periods regarding private variables is common knowledge of prefer-
ences over continuation contracts. That is, at the beginning of a given
date, an agent’s forward looking utilityof following a given strategywhen
facing a given contract is independent of past histories — either publiclyor
privatelyobserved. This makes the deﬁnition of incentive compatible con-
tracts from anydate onwards a straightforward exercise enabling an equally
simple recursive formulation of such problems. Without such an assump-
tion, incentive compatibilityis likelyto depend on privatelyobserved past
histories and this link across time periods turns the recursive formulation
into a more involved problem.
The fact that privatelyobserved past histories inﬂuence the wayin which
agents evaluate continuation contracts makes it necessaryto consider all
the potentiallydiﬀerent types of agents that a social planner, say, may
be facing at a certain point in time. Incentive compatibilityin a recursive
sense still has a period byperiod forward looking component. However, the
link across time periods additionallyconstrains today ’s decisions, forcing
current choices to ensure that no gains are made byan agent who deviated
yesterday. In other words, the link across time periods brings an element
of threat keeping constraining today’s decisions. This additional condition
accounts for an enlarged state vector as compared to the case when there
is common knowledge of preferences. It also introduces an element of in-
eﬃciencyto the continuation contract since, in the current period, it is no
longer necessaryto give incentives towards choices made in the past.
1Taub [14] allows persistent shocks to private endowments in a linear-quadratic model
(with a restriction to linear contracts). Cole and Kocherlakota [4] consider, using non-
recursive methods, a model where agents can unobservably store. Finally, Cole and
Kocherlakota [5] consider extending the results of [1] to games where past private play
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In this paper, we present general recursive methods to handle environ-
ments where privatelyobserved variables are linked over time, or where
common knowledge of preferences over continuation contracts is violated.
We present this ﬁrst bymodify ing Green’s [6] privatelyobserved endow-
ment model to allow endowments to follow a ﬁrst-order Markov process.
Serial correlation violates common knowledge of preferences over continu-
ation contracts because, at the beginning of anyperiod, the agent alone
knows for certain the true probabilityof future events. We show that this
problem nevertheless has a recursive structure and can be solved using a
modiﬁed Bellman equation formulation. We next present a computed ex-
ample of our model and discuss the characteristics of the eﬃcient contract.
We then extend these methods to two other environments — a taste shock
model with Markov shocks and a privatelyobserved eﬀort model where
output is a stochastic function of the current eﬀort level and eﬀort in the
previous period. We conclude bydiscussing the applicabilityof these ar-
guments more generally.
2. A STOCHASTIC ENDOWMENT MODEL
In the current section, we will consider a version of Green[6]. Time is
discrete and t =0 ,1,...,∞. Agents in this economyexperience endowment
shocks which are private information.
For simplicity, let the realizations of the endowment process ht take on
two values, ht ∈ H = {hH,h L}, for all t, where hH >h L ≥ c ∈ R. The
endowment process of a representative agent follows a ﬁrst-order Markov
process, where π (ht−1) denotes the probabilitythat ht = hH given the pre-
vious period realization of the shock. For now, we consider h−1, the “seed”
value of the Markov process, to be public. We assume 0 <π (hj) < 1,
j = H,L. Denote byΠ( ht+j|ht) the probabilityof obtaining endowment
realization ht+j given that ht occurred, induced bythe Markov process just




denote the probabilityof subsequent
history {ht+1,...,h t+j} given ht. Endowment realizations are assumed
uncorrelated across agents, and all agents face the same probabilitydistri-
bution governing their private endowment process. Further, as in Green [6],
we assume that societyhas the abilityto linearlytransfer resources through
time, and let q ∈ (0,1) denote the exogenous price of the consumption good
in period t + 1 in terms of date t consumption.
Let B =[ b,b] ⊂ R be the set of feasible consumption values. Agents





βtU (ct),4 FERNANDES AND PHELAN
where U : B → R is strictlyincreasing and strictlyconcave and β ∈ (0,1).2
The implied set for the feasible values of momentaryutilityis D =[ d,d],





Eﬃcient allocations in this environment can be found byconsidering
a planning problem where the planner chooses a sequence of conditional
transfers to the agent which minimizes the cost of delivering the agent an
expected lifetime utilityof w0, given that endowment probabilities are de-
termined byan initial endowment h−1. We also ﬁnd it useful to consider an
auxiliaryproblem where the planner is additionallyconstrained to deliver
a utilityˆw0 to an agent whose endowment probabilities are determined by
the complement of h−1 (denoted hc
−1) as opposed to h−1.
Let Ht denote the t+1-th Cartesian product of the set H = {hH,h L},
with typical element ht =( h0,h 1,...,ht). Deﬁne a reporting strategy  h as a
sequence { ht(ht)}∞
t=0 mapping histories ht ∈ Ht to a report of the current
endowment realization. Dependence on the initial state (h−1,w 0) is left
implicit. Deﬁne a transfer system τ as a sequence of functions {τt}∞
t=0
such that τt : Ht → R and τt (ht) ≥− ht, for all t, for all ht ∈ Ht.I n
words, the transfer system states the transfer from the planner to the agent
at each date as a function of the historyof announcements to that date
subject to the planner taking no more from the agent than his announced
endowment.3 Again, dependence on the initial state is left implicit. In
the planner’s problem, this initial state is (h−1,w 0), and in the auxiliary
planner’s problem, this initial state is (h−1,w 0, ˆ w0).
The timing of events is as follows. Period t begins after history ht−1 ∈
Ht−1 has taken place and the sequence of reports  ht−1 
ht−1
=(  h0(h0),
 h1(h1),..., ht−1(ht−1)) has been submitted to the planner. The agent ob-
serves his period t income shock ht and reports its realization to the planner
according to the strategy  ht(ht). The planner then provides the (possi-








2The restriction of the consumption set to a compact interval has the sole purpose of
ensuring the boundedness of expected discounted utility and may therefore be substan-
tially relaxed.
3Imposing τ (ht) ≥− ht does not rule out the possibility, for reported endowment




+ ht ≤ b, where b is the lower bound on
consumption. Given this, one must either deﬁne U over consumption levels lower than
b or disallow the agent from claiming a higher than actual endowment. If one assumes
U (c)=−∞, for c ∈ (−∞,b) these are equivalent. A contract, at arbitrarily low cost, can
keep an agent with a low endowment from reporting high by having an arbitrarily small
probability of a low-claiming-high agent consuming below b. For notational convenience,
we do not impose a restriction that low agents cannot claim high. In our computed
example, this restriction is explicit.REPEATED AGENCY WITH HISTORY DEPENDENCE 5
In what follows, it will be convenient to map the transfers τ into a se-
quence of utilityendowments. Let C ( u) denote the amount of the con-
sumption good needed to provide  u units of momentaryutilityto a rep-
resentative agent. From the properties of the function U, we have that
C ( u) ≡ U−1 ( u) is uniquelydeﬁned for all  u ∈ D and C : D → B is a
strictlyincreasing and strictlyconvex function. In the planner’s problem,
we deﬁne an allocation u to be a sequence of functions {ut}∞
t=0 such that












We will now more fullydescribe the inﬁnite sequence problem and the
inﬁnite sequence auxiliaryproblem faced bythe planner. As stated earlier,
in the planner’s problem the planner takes as given values for (h−1,w 0).
We sayan allocation is incentive compatible if it induces an agent with
initial condition h−1 never to misreport his endowment realization. An

































An allocation satisﬁes promise keeping if it delivers w0 units of expected














Given initial state variables (h−1,w 0), the planner’s problem is deﬁned
as choosing an allocation u to minimize the cost of providing w0 units of
expected discounted utility,






















subject to (1) and (2).
We deﬁne the auxiliaryplanning problem as that of choosing an alloca-
tion to minimize the cost of providing (w0, ˆ w0) units of expected discounted6 FERNANDES AND PHELAN
utilityto agents with seed values ( h−1,h c
−1), respectively:





































Let W∗(h−1) be the set of (w0, ˆ w0) values such that there exists an
allocation satisfying (1), (2), and (5). For now, we simply assume (and later
prove) that this is a non-empty, compact set. Finally, note that solving the
auxiliaryproblem is one method of solving the planning problem. That is,
V (h−1,w 0) = min
ˆ w0
VA(h−1,w 0, ˆ w0), (6)
subject to
(w0, ˆ w0) ∈ W∗(h−1). (7)
We next turn to showing that the auxiliaryproblem is recursive.
2.1. The Recursive Formulation
This subsection provides a recursive formulation for the auxiliaryplan-
ner’s problem described above. Our strategyis to reformulate the auxiliary
planner’s problem into the form of Stokeyand Lucas [12] and, from there,
simplyapplytheir theorems. In their formulation, the onlychoice variables
are the future values of the state variables, and the constraint set is ex-
pressed recursively. That is, if st is the state variable and ht is the current
shock, the per-period, certain-outcome objective function is expressed as
F(ht,s t,s t+1) and the constraint set is expressed, for all t and histories of
shocks ht,a sst+1(ht) ∈ Γ(st(ht−1),h t). The major result of this section is
to show that the constraint set of the auxiliaryplanner’s problem can be
expressed in this form.
To do this, ﬁrst take as given an allocation (or plan) {ut(ht)}∞
t=0.F o r





















The ﬁrst object represents the forward looking lifetime utilityof an agent
at the beginning of date t + 1, given the above plan, after the truthful an-
nouncement of endowment ht and truthful revelation of subsequent shocks.
The second object represents the forward looking lifetime utilityof an agent
at the beginning of date t+1, given the above plan, where ht was announced
but hc
t actuallyoccurred, again given truthful revelation of subsequent
shocks.
We next prove the following lemma which shows that if an allocation u
satisﬁes incentive compatibility, then an agent who has lied in the past will
weaklyprefer to tell the truth in the future. To do this, let { hτ(hτ|ht−1,
ˆ ht−1)}∞
τ=0 denote a continuation reporting strategyfor dates t+τ on, after
history ht−1 and announced history ˆ ht−1. We deﬁne an allocation u to be



























Lemma 2.1. Let u satisfy equation (1), the time-zero incentive compat-
ibility condition. Then, for any time period t, past history of reports ˆ ht−1
and true realizations ht−1, u is incentive compatible after (ht−1,ˆ ht−1).
Proof. The incentive compatibilityconstraint, equation (1), implies
that u is incentive compatible after anytruthfullyreported history ht−1.
If not, there exists a continuation strategy  h = { hτ(hτ|ht−1,h t−1)}∞
τ=0
which delivers a higher continuation utilitythan truth-telling. Consider
a time zero reporting strategywhich consists of truth-telling before date
t and after all histories other than ht−1 but which follows  h after history
ht−1. Since ht−1 occurs with positive probability, this time zero reporting





























for all continuation reporting strategies  h = { hτ(hτ|ht−1,h t−1)}∞
τ=0.































Suppose there exists a history, an announced history proﬁle (ht−1,ˆ ht−1),
and a reporting strategy  h after (ht−1,ˆ ht−1) which does better than truth-
telling (or violates equation (12)). For this to be true, it must be the case
that conditional on either ht = hH or ht = hL, the reporting strategyim-
proves on truth-telling. For now, let this be ht = hH. Consider another re-
porting strategy h which follows  h given ht = hH and involves truth-telling
following ht = hL. Since hH occurs with positive probability, h also domi-
nates truth-telling. Next, consider the historyand the announced history
proﬁle (ˆ ht−1,ˆ ht−1). This proﬁle invokes the same continuation plan ut as
(ht−1,ˆ ht−1) (since the announced historyis the same) but involves diﬀerent
probabilities of future events (since the actual histories diﬀer). Neverthe-
less, given the actual history ˆ ht−1,e v e n tht = hH still occurs with positive
probability, and thus ifh dominates truth-telling given proﬁle (ht−1,ˆ ht−1),
it dominates truth-telling given proﬁle (ˆ ht−1,ˆ ht−1). This contradicts equa-
tion (11). The same argument is made if  h improves on truth-telling given
ht = hL.
We now turn to the main result of this section.
Theorem 2.1. Let u = {ut}∞
t=0 be a sequence of functions such that
ut : Ht → D. The sequence u is incentive compatible (or satisﬁes 1) if



























Proof. Suppose a sequence u satisﬁes (1) but for some t and ht violates
(13). Given this, deﬁne a deviation strategy ˜ h in which the agent lies
onlyat date t given ht. Since (13) is violated, and all histories occur with
positive probability, (1) is violated.
Next, suppose u satisﬁes (13) for all t and ht, but violates (1). Then
there exists a reporting strategy  h such that



















exceeds w0, the utilityassociated with truth-telling, byan amount a>0.
Deﬁne the strategy  hτ as follows. Let  hτ
t (ht)= ht (ht), if t<τ , and
 hτ
t (ht)=ht, for t ≥ τ. Deﬁne Ht
true = {ht| ht(ht)=ht} and Ht
false =
{ht| ht(ht)=hc








































Since the set of utilities D is bounded and β<1, W0(˜ hτ) converges to
W0(˜ h)a sτ →∞ . Thus we can choose τ such that






a/2. We next show W0( hτ) ≤ w0, yielding a contradiction.
Consider date τ, the last period where  hτ can recommend lying and sup-
pose  hτ(hτ−1)=hτ−1 (truth-telling at date τ − 1). That equation (13)
holds in period τ implies that  hτ does not improve on truth-telling from pe-
riod τ on. Lemma 2.1 then implies that  hτ does not improve on truth-telling
from period τ on in the case that the agent lied at date τ − 1. Given this,
that (13) holds for all t<τimplies (through backward application) that
˜ hτ(ht) does not improve on truth-telling at date t = 0. This contradicts the
assumption that W0( h) − w0 >a .10 FERNANDES AND PHELAN
Equation (13) represents the temporary incentive compatibility constraint,
to use the terminologyof Green [6]. The consequences of ly ing implya dif-
ferent immediate utilityas well as a diﬀerent continuation promise relative
to the transfer and continuation promise obtained under the true report.
Unlike the case where preferences over future contracts are common knowl-
edge, the planner now potentiallyfaces two ty pes of agents: those who
received endowment ht and reported so, and those who had endowment hc
t
yet reported ht. Again, unlike the common knowledge benchmark, these
two agents are diﬀerent since theycompute the expectation of future utility
streams using diﬀerent probabilitydistributions. Ensuring that incentive
compatibilityholds implies therefore that both continuation promised util-
ities — wt+1 and ˆ wt+1 — have to be delivered, in period t + 1. This is
















. We refer to
this latter constraint as threat keeping, whereas the former condition is






j=0 to deliver ˆ wt+1 (ht) under Π(hj|
hc






incentive compatible from the perspective of period t (that is, it ensures
that an agent who lied at time t does not beneﬁt from such deviation as his
continuation utilityˆwt+1 (ht) is held constant), it introduces an element of
ineﬃciencyconcerning future contracts: both principal and agent could be
made better oﬀ if such an adding up constraint was not present.
We now turn to writing the constraint set in the recursive form st+1(ht) ∈











Likewise, if equations (16) and (17) hold for every ht−1, then equations (8)
and (9) hold.
For given values of t, and ht−1, the two equations (16) and (17) can be
solved for ut(ht−1,h L) and ut(ht−1,h H) as linear functions of wt(ht−1),
ˆ wt(ht−1), wt+1(ht) and ˆ wt+1(ht). This implies one can consider the choice
variables to be a sequence of conditional lifetime continuation utilities w =
{wt(ht−1), ˆ wt(ht−1)}∞
t=1 such that equations (16) and (17) hold, instead
of the sequence of utilitypay ments u = {ut(ht)}∞
t=0. Anysequence ofREPEATED AGENCY WITH HISTORY DEPENDENCE 11
conditional lifetime continuation utilities w uniquelyimplies, for a given
s0 = {h−1,w 0, ˆ w0}, a sequence of conditional utilitypay ments u, and any
sequence of conditional utilitypay ments u can be achieved bya sequence
of continuation utilities w. Theorem 1 in turn implies that if promise
keeping and threat keeping hold — (16) and (17), respectively— along
with (13) — the temporaryincentive compatibilityconstraint — then the
sequence {wt(ht−1), ˆ wt(ht−1)}∞
t=1 is incentive compatible. Thus conditions
(16), (17), and (13) implythe same constraint set for the auxiliaryplanning
problem as equations (2), (5) and (1), but where each constraint is written
onlyas a function of st and st+1, for
st(ht−1) ≡ (ht−1,w t(ht−1), ˆ wt(ht−1)). (18)
Finally, the return function for the auxiliary planner’s problem can be
stated





where ut(ht) is determined by st(ht−1) and st+1(ht) according to (16) and
(17). This puts our problem in the form of Stokeyand Lucas [12] with the
following exception. We have not yet shown that the set of (w, ˆ w) pairs
such that there exists an incentive compatible contract which delivers these
lifetime utilities is non-emptyand compact. This is constructivelyshown
using a rather straightforward application of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti
[1].
Let W∗(h−) be the set of (w, ˆ w) pairs such that there exists an allocation
satisfying (1), (2), and (5).
Lemma 2.2. The set W∗(h−) is non-empty and compact for each h−.
Proof. Setting ut = U(b) at all dates given all announcements is incen-
tive compatible and delivers the same utilityregardless of h−,t h u sW∗(h−)
is non-empty. Next, for each h−, for an arbitrarycompact set W(h−), de-
ﬁne
B(W)(h−)={(w, ˆ w)|there exists (u(h),w (h), ˆ w (h)) such that
u(h) ∈ [U(b),U(b)] for each h











u(h)+βw (h) ≥ U(h + C(u(hc)) − hc)+β ˆ w (hc)}.
This is the standard Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti operator applied to this
contracting framework. Results from [1] apply, delivering that W∗(h−)i s
compact.
Given the state space deﬁned by( h−,W∗(h−)), we can write the aux-
iliaryplanner’s problem in the following recursive form. In this form, for
each h ∈ H, the choice variables are u(h), the current utilitytransfer as
a function of the announced endowment; w (h), the lifetime continuation
utilitypromise as a function of the announced endowment; and ˆ w (h), the
utilitythat the planner tells the agent he will receive from the continuation
allocation if he announces h but is lying. We write the state variables as
h−, the reported endowment realization last period; w, the promised utility
of an agent who truthfullyannounced h− last period; and ˆ w, the promised
utilityof an agent who falselyannounced h− last period. Our recursive
operator T, deﬁned on the space of bounded continuous functions mapping
triples (h−,w, ˆ w) → R, is then
T(vA)(h−,w, ˆ w) ≡ (21)
min
u(h),w (h), ˆ w (h)

h∈H











and, for each h ∈ H,
u(h)+βw (h) ≥ U(h + C(u(hc)) − hc)+β ˆ w (hc), (24)
along with u(h) ∈ [U(b),U(b)] and (w (h), ˆ w (h)) ∈ W∗(h). The results
of Stokeyand Lucas [12] for this problem can then be summarized bythe
following Lemma.REPEATED AGENCY WITH HISTORY DEPENDENCE 13
Lemma 2.3. The function VA is the unique ﬁxed point of T. Further,
the policies u(h|h−,w, ˆ w), w (h|h−,w, ˆ w), ˆ w (h|h−,w, ˆ w) which solve (21)
solve the inﬁnite sequence auxiliary planning problem. Conversely, a solu-
tion {ut(ht)}∞
t=0 to the inﬁnite sequence auxiliary planning problem solves




C(ut(ht)) − ht + qVA(ht,w 




for all t − 1, ht−1.
Proof. Stokeyand Lucas [12], Theorems 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5.
2.2. Discussion
We now look more carefullyinto the relationship between the auxiliary
planner’s problem, which we have just shown has a recursive structure,
and the planner’s problem. In the planner’s problem, societyis assumed to
know the “seed value” h−1 of the endowment process, for each agent, and
minimize the cost of providing an incentive compatible allocation which
delivers lifetime utility w0. The auxiliaryproblem additionallyimposes a
condition that the allocation delivers a lifetime utilityˆw0 to an agent with
seed value hc
−1. The fact that the auxiliaryplanner’s problem is recur-
sive, along with the fact that the solution to the planner’s problem is also
the solution to the auxiliaryplanner’s problem for some ˆ w0 (equation (6)),
implies that the continuation of a solution to the planner’s problem is a
solution to the auxiliaryplanner’s problem from that date on, for the ap-
propriate values of (h−,w, ˆ w). This does not implythat the continuation of
a solution to the planner’s problem is itself a solution to the planner’s prob-
lem for the appropriate (h−1,w), which is preciselythe condition needed
for a plan to be ex-post eﬃcient.
In the recursive form of the auxiliaryplanning problem, there are con-
straints which would not exist in any ex-post Pareto optimization. Speciﬁ-
cally, on the equilibrium path, the agent who lied last period about his en-
dowment doesn’t exist, and keeping this agent’s utilityconstant (equation
(23)) is simplyan extra constraint. If this constraint binds, byreoptimiz-
ing without the constraint both parties could be made better oﬀ, implying
that a solution to the planner’s problem is not “time-consistent.”14 FERNANDES AND PHELAN
3. COMPUTATION AND CHARACTERIZATION
The recursive formulation given is itself an algorithm for computing eﬃ-
cient contracts. The set W(h−) (for each h−) can be computed as follows.
First, the highest w which can be delivered is simply U(b)/(1 − β). Next,
the lowest w which can be delivered is the utilityassociated with consum-
ing b whenever h = hL and consuming b + hH − hL whenever h = hH.
(This utilitycan alway s be achieved unilaterallybyan agent.) Let w(h)
denote the lowest discounted utilityattainable when h occurred last pe-
riod. Thus the set W(h−) can be represented bytwo functions deﬁning





. If these functions are set to the highest and lowest
values associated with bounded consumption, repeated application of the
APS operator outlined in the proof of Lemma 2.2 converges to the true
set W∗(h−). Given W∗(h−), the function VA(h−,w, ˆ w) can be computed
using the T operator deﬁned in equation (21).
We have computed the following example. An agent’s endowment is
either hL = .1o rhH = .35. We assume that an agent who has endowment
hH can claim hL but an agent with endowment hL cannot claim hH. (See
footnote 3.) The Markov process governing these endowments is simply
that the agent has a 90% chance of receiving the endowment he received
in the previous period. His utilityfunction is U(c)=
√
c with a restriction
that c ∈ [0,1] with a discount parameter β = .9.








Figure 1: W∗(hL)REPEATED AGENCY WITH HISTORY DEPENDENCE 15
Figure 1 displays the set of feasible utility pairs (w, ˆ w) given h− = hL,
W∗ (hL). The dashed line represents the ˆ w point which achieves the mini-
mum of VA(hL,w, ˆ w) (or the ex-post eﬃcient ˆ w given w). Call this function
ˆ w∗(w). The area above ˆ w∗(w) is, in an important sense, irrelevant. Exam-
ination of the Bellman equation (21) reveals that no eﬃcient t = 0 contract
would ever map to this area. Doing so both raises costs and tightens the
incentive constraint at t = 0. (Since hH cannot be falselyclaimed, this
graph is unnecessaryfor h− = hH. If an agent announces hH, the continu-
ation contract is always ex-post eﬃcient since the type of agent is common
knowledge.) The area below ˆ w∗(w) represents the ex-post ineﬃcient points
that maybe mapped to bythe continuation of an eﬃcient contract. Doing
so loosens the incentive constraint at period t = 0. In fact, if an eﬃcient
contract maps to w (hL) and VA(hL,w  (hL), ˆ w∗(w (hL))) is diﬀerentiable
with respect to ˆ w at this point, then the continuation given h = hL must
be ineﬃcient. (The t = 0 incentive constraint is loosened at zero marginal
cost). We have not proved that VA is diﬀerentiable. On the other hand,
Figure 2 displays VA(hL,w, ˆ w) for a particular w for this example and it
appears smooth.










Figure 2: VA(hL,w=8 .75, ˆ w).
What do such ineﬃcient contracts look like? For our computed exam-
ple, two characteristics stand out. First, the continuation of an ineﬃcient
contract is itself an ineﬃcient contract as long as ht = hL, but less so each
time. This is shown in Figure 3 which displays the path of (wt, ˆ wt) when
h− = hH, but then a long string of hL realizations occurs.16 FERNANDES AND PHELAN










Figure 3: Path of (w, ˆ w) given string of hL realizations.
Second, ineﬃcient contracts given h− = hL exaggerate a propertyof ex-
post eﬃcient contracts of pushing utilitypay ments toward current utility
payments conditional on the low realization, u(hL). That is, relative to
the autarkic contract (zero transfers at all times) an eﬃcient incentive
compatible contract pushes utilitypay ments toward the low realization for
insurance reasons. To do so in a waywhich holds w constant, the contract
must raise the sum u(hL)+βw (hL) and lower the sum u(hH)+βw (hH)
bya given proportion. This also lowers the left hand side (truth-telling)
of the incentive constraint associated with h = hH. Maintaining incentive
compatibilitythen requires that the right hand side (the value to falsely
claiming low) be decreased even though the utilityof an agent truthfully
announcing low, u(hL)+βw (hL), is being increased. This is achieved by
exploiting the fact that an agent who actuallyhas an endowment of hL
values current marginal consumption more than an agent who is falsely
announcing hL. That is, u(hL) is raised and both w (hL) and ˆ w (hL) are
lowered relative to the autarkic contract. The ex-post eﬃcient contact,
in eﬀect, optimallytrades the insurance beneﬁt associated with pushing
utilitytoward the h = hL realization, and the cost associated with uneven
consumption over time needed to make this insurance incentive compatible.
The ex-post ineﬃcient contracts act much in the same way, but where more
utilityis pushed toward the h = hL realization than the insurance motive
alone would justify.REPEATED AGENCY WITH HISTORY DEPENDENCE 17
4. EXTENSIONS AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTS
An important issue is whether the methodologywe present for the stochas-
tic endowment economywith historydependent shocks is general. For
instance, we require the shock to take on onlytwo values. If the shock
instead were to take on N values, our state variables would be (h−1,w,ˆ w),
where ˆ w is an N − 1 element vector specifying the continuation utility for
each possible realization of h in the previous period other than the report
h−1. Likewise, if the Markov process is of ﬁnite order N>1, it is well
known that this can be mapped into a single stage Markov process where
the state space h is expanded to include the last N realizations of the en-
dowment. In this case, our state variables are again (h−1,w,ˆ w), but where
h−1 takes on 2N values and ˆ w is a 2N −1 element vector. In general, what
is required is that the state variables contain the utilityof everypossible
unobserved “type” at the beginning of period t. Two agents are of a diﬀer-
ent type at the beginning of a period if there is any continuation contract
and continuation strategywhere the utilities of the two agents diﬀer given
the continuation contract and strategy.
Another relevant matter concerns the applicabilityof lemma 2.1. The
endowment shock environment presented above displays a form of separa-
bility in the sense that past reports do not aﬀect one’s incentives to report
truthfullyfrom todayonwards. In other words, truth-telling incentives for
the current date on are eﬀective concerning both an agent who misreported
the shock realization in the past as well as a truth-telling agent. In other
environments, however, it is possible that after previous deviations, the
agent mayprefer to engage in a strategyof inﬁnite deviations. In fact, this
non-separabilityis present in the privatelyobserved eﬀort model discussed
below which, nonetheless, has a recursive structure.
Besanko [3] characterizes a multi-period contract between principal and
agent in the presence of adverse selection, under the assumption that prin-
cipal and agent are risk-neutral. In his model, the privatelyobserved cost-
eﬃciencyparameter can take on a continuum of values. He derives the
recursive form of the incentive compatibilityconstraint for his problem,
the analogue of equation (13) in our paper. The structure of this class
of models enables direct substitution of this period byperiod condition in
the principal’s sequence utilityfunction. Direct substitution provides an
additional simpliﬁcation in that threat keeping is automaticallyimposed
as well. Since past shocks do not aﬀect current utilitydirectly , his prob-
lem display s the separabilitypropertyreferred to, above, indicating that
truth-telling incentives to an agent who has reported truthfullyalso apply
to an agent who misreported his type in the past. Confronting Besanko’s
result with those in our paper, we were able to generalize the incentive
compatibilityconditions to non-separable situations (see section 4.2), as18 FERNANDES AND PHELAN
well as provide a complete recursive formulation of the inﬁnite sequence
contract. The recursive formulation presented here is not well-suited to
handle a continuum of types, however.
We next applythe recursive formulation to two other environments com-
monlyseen in the repeated contracting literature: unobserved taste shocks
(the focus of Atkeson and Lucas [2]) and unobserved eﬀort (the focus of
Spear and Srivastava [11] and Phelan and Townsend [10]). In each of these
environments, the authors have assumed that privatelyobserved random
variables are independent over time, and privatelyobserved eﬀorts only
aﬀect output in the period the eﬀort is taken. These assumptions precisely
insure that there is onlyone ty pe at the beginning of anyperiod. (Past
deviations do not aﬀect one’s utilityfor anycontinuation contract given
anystrategy .)
In the introduction, we argued for the relevance of relaxing these assump-
tions. We now move to demonstrating the recursive structure for a taste
shock model with Markov shocks and an unobserved eﬀort model where
output depends on eﬀort in the previous period as well as on the current
eﬀort choice. We show analogues of Theorem 1 for both these environments
and produce the corresponding recursive formulations.
We note that these two environments diﬀer in one respect, however.
For the case of correlated taste shocks, an analogue of Lemma 1 holds,
therefore ensuring that incentive compatible allocations (from the perspec-
tive of time 0) are also incentive compatible at anylater date, after all
histories of reports and realizations of the shocks. In the eﬀort model,
where output depends on current and last period’s eﬀort, this separability
is no longer present: if the agent took an action diﬀerent than the recom-
mended level of eﬀort in the past, he mayprefer to continue to deviate
from the recommended actions todayand in the future. We show how to
modifythe promised utilityfor a deviant agent in order to accommodate
this non-separability, and point out how to interpret “temporary incentive
compatibility,” in this context.
4.1. Private Taste Shocks
The private taste shock model can be described bymaking a few sim-
ple changes to the privatelyobserved endowment model. First, let each
agent’s endowment always equal ¯ e. Next, as before, let ht ∈{ hL,h H} with
Π(ht|h0) denoting the probabilityof history ht = {h0,h 1,...,h t} given h0,
but change the interpretation of ht from an endowment shock to a taste
shock. That is, if c = {ct}∞
t=0 and h = {ht}∞
t=0 are deterministic sequences
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where U : B ×H → R is strictlyincreasing and strictlyconcave in its ﬁrst
argument and β ∈ (0,1). Feasible values for discounted utilityare then




/(1 − β) for
h ∈{ hL,h H}.
As before, we can consider the planner to be delivering utils as opposed
to consumption transfers. Where before the amount of the consumption
needed to deliver ˜ u utils was C(˜ u)=U−1(˜ u), here the amount of the con-
sumption needed to deliver ˜ u utils is C(˜ u,h)=U−1(˜ u,h). This structure is
so similar to the unobserved endowment model that Lemma 1 and Theorem
1 go through with little modiﬁcation.
Given this, we move to writing the auxiliaryplanner’s problem in re-
cursive form. As before, let W∗ (h−) denote the set of (w, ˆ w) pairs such
that there exists an allocation satisfying (the current analogues of) promise
keeping, threat keeping and incentive compatibility. For each h ∈ H, the
choice variables are u(h), the current utilitytransfer as a function of the
announced shock; w (h), the lifetime continuation utilitypromise as a func-
tion of the announced shock; and ˆ w (h), the utilitythat the planner tells
the agent he will receive from the continuation allocation if he announces h
but is lying. These are exactly the same choice variables for the recursive
form of the unobserved endowment model. The state variables — h−, the
reported shock last period; w, the promised utilityof an agent who truth-
fullyannounced h− last period; and ˆ w, the promised utilityof an agent
who falselyannounced h− last period — are the same as for the unobserved
endowment model as well. The recursive operator T, deﬁned on the space
of bounded continuous functions mapping H × D × D → R, is then
T(vA)(h−,w, ˆ w) = (26)
min
u(h),w (h), ˆ w (h)

h∈H











and, for each h ∈ H,
u(h)+βw (h) ≥ U(C(u(hc),h c),h)+β ˆ w (hc), (29)
as well as u(h) ∈ Dh and (w  (h), ˆ w  (h)) ∈ W∗ (h).20 FERNANDES AND PHELAN
4.2. Privately Observed Eﬀort
In this section we consider a privatelyobserved eﬀort model where out-
put depends on eﬀort in the previous period as well as on the current eﬀort
choice. This environment is similar to the previous two models in that at
the beginning of date t, the “type” of agent is not common knowledge: the
agent knows how much he worked in the previous period while the planner
does not. As in the previous environments, and unlike environments where
output onlydepends on eﬀort in the current period, this eliminates com-
mon knowledge regarding the probabilityof future events. The noveltyof
the current environment, however, is that unlike the endowment and taste
shock cases, in the current setup no analogue of Lemma 1 holds: there
is no guarantee that an incentive compatible plan will have an agent who
deviated in the past not wishing to deviate in the future. Nevertheless, we
show that an analogue to Theorem 1 holds.
Here, let ht ∈{ hL,h H} denote the observable endowment. Next, let the
probabilityof the high endowment in period t, denoted π(at,a t−1), depend
on unobserved eﬀort a ∈ A = {aL,a H} carried out bythe agent in the cur-
rent and previous periods. This speciﬁes the physical environment. Next,






where U : B × A → R is strictlyincreasing and strictlyconcave in its ﬁrst
argument and β ∈ (0,1). Feasible values of momentaryutilityare then




/(1 − β) for
a ∈ A.
As in the previous two environments, we can consider the planner to be
delivering utils as opposed to consumption transfers. Here the amount of
consumption necessaryto deliver ˜ u utils is C(˜ u,a)=U−1(˜ u,a). We deﬁne
an eﬀort strategy as a sequence  a = { at(ht−1)}∞
t=0 where  at : Ht−1 → A.
Next, recall that in the auxiliaryplanner’s problem for the unobserved en-
dowment environment, the planner not onlymust deliver a speciﬁed lifetime
utility w0 to an agent whose “seed” value of the Markov process is h−1 but
also must deliver a lifetime utilityˆw0 to an agent whose seed value is hc
−1.
In this case, we require this as well, where these seed values correspond
to a−1 and ac
−1. (In this environment, it is actions, not the endowments,
which are unobserved.)





t=0, describing the recommended eﬀorts for the agent, and u =
{ut(ht)}∞
t=0 where ut : Ht → Dat(ht−1), describing utilitypay ments.
Let Π(ht|a,a−1) denote the probabilityof sequence {h0,h 1,...,h t} given
π, an eﬀort strategy a and a seed value a−1. We sayan allocation is incen-REPEATED AGENCY WITH HISTORY DEPENDENCE 21
tive compatible if it induces an agent to follow the recommended strategy.
































An allocation satisﬁes promise keeping if it delivers w0 units of expected














An allocation satisﬁes threat keeping if it delivers ˆ w0 units of expected
discounted utilityto an optimizing agent with seed value ac
−1:





















Let W∗ (a−) be the set of (w, ˆ w) pairs such that there exists an allocation
satisfying (30), (31) and (32). Given initial state variables (a−1,w 0, ˆ w0) ∈
A×W∗ (a−1), the auxiliaryplanner’s problem is deﬁned as choosing an al-
location {a,u} to minimize the cost of providing (w0, ˆ w0) units of expected
discounted utility:






















subject to (30) through (32).
Next, take as given an allocation {a,u}. Let a(ht−1)={aτ(hτ−1|
ht−1)}∞
τ=0 denote the continuation strategyinduced by a after endowment
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This represents the forward looking utilityof an obedient agent up to and














at+τ(ht−1,h τ−1)), aτ(ht−1,h τ−1))Π(hτ| a(ht−1),a c
t(ht−2)).
This represents the forward looking utilityof an optimizing agent who
obeyed up to date t−2 but deviated at date t−1. This can also be written
recursivelyas










































We now prove the analogue of Theorem 1.
Theorem 4.1. The allocation {a,u} is incentive compatible (satisﬁes
(30)) if and only if it satisﬁes the following condition, for all time periods























C(ut(ht−1,h t),a t(ht−1)),a c
t(ht−1)

+ β ˆ wt+1(ht−1,h t)







Proof. An incentive compatible allocation triviallysatisﬁes (38). We
must show that, if {a,u} satisﬁes (38), it satisﬁes (30). Suppose not. Then,
for a speciﬁcation of {a,u} that satisﬁes (38), there exists an eﬀort strategy
 a such that

















exceeds w0, the utilityassociated with obedience.
Let τ∗ denote the ﬁrst date where there exists some history hτ
∗−1 where
action aτ(hτ
∗−1)  =  aτ(hτ
∗−1). Consider equation (38), for an arbitrary
hτ
∗−1. Here, the left hand side is the continuation utilityof following the
recommended action strategy aτ(hτ
∗−1). The right hand side is the contin-
uation utilityof taking action ac
τ(hτ
∗−1) and following the best deviation
strategyfrom τ∗ + 1 on. Thus the left hand side weaklyexceeds the con-
tinuation utilityof following  a. Since the per period utilities of following
a and  a are equal for dates t<τ ∗ and the above holds for all histories hτ
∗−1,
W0( a) ≤ w0, yielding a contradiction.















β ˆ wt+1(ht−1,h t)}π(ht|ac
t(ht−1),a t−1(ht−2)),
given equations (35) and (36).
We note that the fact that Lemma 1 does not hold in this environment




. In fact, the continuation utilitypromised to an agent who does
not take the recommended action takes into account the fact that this
agent mayoptimallychoose to continue to deviate in the future. Hence,
the formula for ˆ wt(ht−1), equation (36), contains the “max” operator with
respect to all possible eﬀort strategies, no longer assuming that this agent
will choose to take the recommended actions from period t on. Therefore, in
environments where there exists such non-separability, temporary incentive
compatibility should be taken to mean that incentives are conveyed towards24 FERNANDES AND PHELAN
inducing truthful revelation (or adequate action) in the current period for
agents who did not deviate in the past. It no longer means (as it is usually
the case in the literature) that we are considering this one time deviation
and going back to truth-telling, as past deviations maynow induce the
agent to engage in a strategywith inﬁnite deviations.
That each constraint can be written recursivelyallows us to write the
auxiliaryplanner’s problem in this environment recursively , as well. In this
form, the choice variables are a, the recommended action for today; u(h),
the current utility payment as a function of today’s output h; w (h), the
continuation utilityof an agent who takes action a in the current period and
has output realization h; and ˆ w (h), the continuation utilityof an agent
who takes action ac in the current period and has output realization h.
The state variables are then a−, the recommended action in the previous
period; w, the continuation utilityof an agent who actuallytook action
a− in the previous period; and ˆ w, the continuation utilityof an agent who
actuallytook action ac
− in the previous period. This makes the Bellman
operator for the auxiliaryprogramming problem in this environment
T(vA)(a−,w, ˆ w) = min
























{U (C (u(h),a)),a c)+β ˆ w (h)}π(h|ac,a −), (44)
as well as u(h) ∈ Da and (w  (h), ˆ w  (h)) ∈ W∗ (h).REPEATED AGENCY WITH HISTORY DEPENDENCE 25
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have derived recursive methods to handle problems
where privatelyobserved variables are linked over time, an extension of
agencytheoryto more realistic environments. We have used Green’s [6]
model with correlated endowment shocks as an illustrative benchmark and
extended these methods to two other environments, considering both se-
riallycorrelated private taste shocks as well as output as a function of
privatelyobserved current and past eﬀort levels.
Despite our use of concrete applications, we believe the general idea un-
derlying this recursive methodology should be clear. Links across time
periods brought about byprivatelyobserved variables cause the common
knowledge over preferences concerning continuation contracts to break down.
This means that the planner, say, cannot distinguish among agents who
have similar past public histories yet whose privately observed past is dif-
ferent. These potential diﬀerences in the agents’ privatelyobserved past
which are compatible with their common publiclyobserved historyare rel-
evant to the extent theyaﬀect the valuation of continuation contracts by
the agent. Enumerating such diﬀerent private histories amounts to con-
sidering all possible types of agents that the planner may be facing at a
certain point in time. Incentive compatibility, in this environment, then im-
plies that the utilityof all these diﬀerent ty pes of agents (who correspond
to all possible past deviations in the form of either lies or not following
recommended actions) has to add up to some pre-speciﬁed amounts. Not
keeping these threats would violate incentive compatibility. Yet, keeping
these additional constraints is Pareto ineﬃcient since it concerns incentives
applying to actions already taken in previous periods.
One of the diﬀerences of the recursive formulation presented in this paper
— as compared to the common knowledge benchmark — is, then, the
additional component of threat keeping. These constraints, together with
the temporaryincentive compatibilityand promise keeping constraints,
implement an inﬁnite sequence of utilityendowments which is incentive
compatible from time 0.
Another point which is speciﬁc to the presence of links across time peri-
ods is the possibility, in some applications, that agents who deviated once
(either misreported income or did not take the recommended action) may
want to follow a strategyof inﬁnite future deviations. We showed how
to take this non-separabilityinto account bykeeping constant the agent’s
future utilitycomputed under the best possible strategyfrom the agent’s
perspective.26 FERNANDES AND PHELAN
REFERENCES
1. Abreu, Dilip, Pearce, David and Ennio Stacchetti (1990) “Toward a Theory of Dis-
counted Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring,” Econometrica, vol. 58(5),
pp. 1041-1063.
2. Atkeson, Andrew and Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (1992), “On Eﬃcient Distribution with
Private Information,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 59(3), pp. 427–453.
3. Besanko, David (1985), “Multi-Period Contracts Between Principal and Agent With
Adverse Selection,” Economic Letters, vol. 17(1), pp. 33-37.
4. Cole, Harold L. and Narayana R. Kocherlakota (1998), “Eﬃcient Allocations With
Hidden Income and Hidden Storage,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Staﬀ
Report No. 238.
5. Cole, Harold L. and Narayana R. Kocherlakota (1998), “Dynamic Games With Hid-
den Actions and Hidden States,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Staﬀ Report
No. 254.
6. Green, Edward J. (1987), “Lending and the Smoothing of Uninsurable Income,” in
E. Prescott and N. Wallace, (Eds.), Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal
Trade (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), pp. 3–25.
7. Hopenhayn, Hugo A. and Juan Pablo Nicolini (1997), “Optimal Unemployment In-
surance,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 105(2), pp. 412–438.
8. Phelan, Christopher (1994), “Incentives and Aggregate Shocks,” Review of Economic
Studies, vol. 61(4), pp. 681–700.
9. Phelan, Christopher (1995), “Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment,”
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 66(2), pp. 488–506.
10. Phelan, Christopher and Robert M. Townsend (1991), “Computing Multi-Period,
Information-Constrained Optima,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 58(5), pp. 853–
881.
11. Spear, Stephen E. and Sanjay Srivastava (1987), “On Repeated Moral Hazard with
Discounting,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 54(4), pp. 599–617.
12. Stokey, Nancy L. and Robert E. Lucas, Jr., with Edward C. Prescott (1989), Recur-
sive Methods in Economic Dynamics (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press).
13. Thomas, Jonathan and Tim Worrall (1990), “Income Fluctuations and Asymmet-
ric Information: An Example of a Repeated Principal-Agent Problem,” Journal of
Economic Theory, vol. 51(2), pp. 367–390.
14. Taub, Bart (1998) “International Financial Equilibrium with Risk Sharing and Pri-
vate Information,” in Current Trends in Economics: Theory and Applications, ed by
A. Alkan, C. Aliprantis, and N. Yannelis. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1999.
15. Wang, Cheng (1995), “Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced
Budgets,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 62(4), pp. 577–595.